

MANAGING PESANTREN AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA The Role of *Kyai* in Decentralization Era

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Abstract

Dalam sejarah politik di Indonesia, pesantren dan kyai memiliki peran yang sangat besar dalam menentukan arah dan tujuan bangsa. Selama lebih dari tigapuluh tahun di bawah Orde Baru, peranan pesantren dan kyai sangat dibatasi, namun otonomi daerah membuka kembali pintu bagi pesantren untuk kembali ke panggung politik. Studi ini menguraikan tentang dampak otonomi daerah terhadap pola hubungan kyai dan santri. Dengan menggunakan studi kasus di Kabupaten Jember, kajian ini menemukan adanya perubahan pola hubungan kyai-santri di komunitas pesantren yang ditandai dengan menurunnya kepatuhan dan respek masyarakat santri terhadap kyai dan pesantren. Studi ini menemukan tiga alasan: pertama, keterlibatan kyai dalam *money politics*; kedua, runtuhnya simbol kyai sebagai penegak moral, dan ketiga menurunnya peranan kyai dalam pembangunan masyarakat di sekitar pesantren.

Keywords: *Pesantren, Kyai, Money Politik, dan Otonomi Daerah*

Introduction

Islam and Politics in Indonesia nowadays are interesting topic to be discussed. Not only because Indonesia is the biggest Moslem country in the world which is dominated by 'moderate Islam' but also the Indonesian elections (the legislative and presidential) have been believed as a big democratic election in the world involving more than 171 million voters. (KPU: 2009). Even though the majority (almost 87 percent) of the voters have been categorized as Moslem; however, since the first election in 1955 the Indonesia Parliament have never been dominated by the Islamic Political Parties.

Some previous researches argue that the *kyai* (Islamic Leader) and *pesantren* (Islamic Boarding School) have had significant power in politics. Za-

maksyari Dhofier (1999) and Geertz (1960) explained that, in the context of societal relationship, *kyai* have a dominant hierarchical character, placing them in a higher social class than the *santri* – a relationship between the teacher and the pupil. The *Kyai* were greatly respected by the *pesantren* community placing them as symbols of morality. *Pesantren* were believed to be the centre of Islamic education as well as the developer of the community.

After the implementation of regional autonomy, however, the role of *kyai* in politics has been questions. The number of *kyai* who has involved with politics increase dramatically; in contrary, the *kyai* political influence to their community is decreasing from 1999 election compared with 2004 and 2009 elections. The data shows the percentage of people who support *Kyai*'s political preference is felling down. Political parties and candidate that are supported by *kyai* has lost in the political competition, even in the area where *kyai* has been living. (CETRO: 2007).

This research was conducted in Jember district – East Java. It argues that there are three factors involved in the changing relations between *Kyai* and *santri* (and also *kyai*'s followers). Firstly, the *kyai* who have involved in politics, mostly have become involved in “money politics” that have not been accepted by their *santri*. As a result, *santri* no longer regard their *kyai* as the symbol of morality, as the *kyai* have breached the religions and social norms. Secondly, *santri* also regard their *kyai* as the figure of morality who is detached from political conflict and rivalry. They are not used to make political choices and deal with the conflicts that might occur in the political processes. In *santri*'s *opinion*, political choices must be taken by the *kyai*. Finally, the *pesantren* in which the *kyai* was involved in politics have lost their function as the centre of community development. This is because the *kyai* do not have time to maintain their role in community education and spend most of their time in political activities. The relationship between *kyai* and the *pesantren* community has been lost as the community meetings and gatherings including *pengajian* are rarely attended by *kyai*.

Kyai and Money Politics

The paradox and irony is that it is believed that the involvement of the community leaders like *kyai* in the political process will support the democ-

atic processes. The fact is, however, *kyai* who are involved in political parties face relationship problems with their *santri* and the *pesantren's* community. *Kyai* who were involved in politics in Jember District mostly conducted “money politics” that were not acceptable to their *santri*. As a result, in spite of their strong power in politics, they have lost their function as the community leaders who were morally respected by the people with important roles in developing the community.

Data from PANWASLU Jember shows that 129 cases were handled by PANWASLU during the election in 2004, 57 cases involved *kyai*, most of them were *kyai* who were political campaigners and legislative candidates, 14 of them were related to money politics such as distributing rice, money, clothes, medicines, and political people mobilization using presents and coupons. (PANWASLU Jember: 2005)

Interviews conducted among the *santri* and in the community around *pesantren* explained why they did not vote for the candidate and political party as supported by the *kyai*. The main reason was that the issue of “money politics” that emerged during the political campaign. These issues entangled the *kyai* in using “dirty” money to support political parties and candidates. As a result, it ruined the image of the *kyai* as community leaders who were concerned with morality and community development.

Anwari, an alumni of *pesantren* argues that some *kyai* who became involved with political parties have found it difficult to avoid becoming involved in ‘money politics’. They need funds for election campaign. The easiest way to get support from the people is by giving them “a present”. Anwari says some people have a political interest in supporting a *kyai* as a candidate, particularly businessmen and contractors. Some of them supported the *kyai* with campaign funds in the expectation that the *kyai* will allocate budget to the businessmen if the *kyai* is elected as member of the council.

“Businessmen have interest in supporting *kyai* as candidates (in the council elections). They live from the local government’s projects (as contractors or sub-contractors). So, by giving ‘presents’ to the *kyai*, they hope that if the *kyai* is elected, they will rewarded with local government projects. This is not just one or two people, nearly all of the businessmen and contactors do this. The *kyai* is OK, because they need the money for the political campaign. (Anwari: Interview, 25/07/2007)

Chairman of the Indonesian Journalist Association (AJI) in Jember, Mahbub Junaedi, believes that some *kyai* were involved in “money politics” during the elections. According to Junaedi, some “money politics” practices were conducted by *kyai* in public areas. Because of these practices, people no longer respected *kyai*.

“They (the people) no longer respect the *kyai* as community leaders who promoted high standards of morality in public life. People think, oh... If it's like this, (with *kyai* involved in political corruption) *kyai* are just the same as other politicians who have long deceived the people. As a result, the people no longer respected and obeyed what the *kyai* have said,” (Mahbub Junaedi: Interview, 21/07/2007)

Mahbub Junaedi also stated that “money politics” was not taboo in politics. He has witnessed a senior *kyai* visiting people's houses, handing out money and rice and asking people to vote for particular candidates.

“During the elections, almost all of the politicians indulged in “money politics”, including the *kyai*. The difference was that the politicians' corruption was sophisticated, the *kyai* were blatant and public, even from the pulpit. This is not good, is it? (Mahbub Junaedi: Interview, 21/07/2007)

Misbah, who lives around *pesantren* argues that the *kyai*'s corruption had lessened the people's support for the candidates and political party endorsed by the *kyai*. Previously, *kyai* had been respected as community leaders because of their support for people's interests.

“...in the past, the *kyai* developed the community, developed the people's morality, but today this is no longer the case. Today if they do something, it's because of money. As a result...people do not trust the *kyai*, especially in politics.” (Misbah: Interview, 25/07/2007)

He argues during New Order, the figure of *kyai* was greatly respected by the *santri* and the *pesantren*'s community. *Kyai* were believed to be symbols of morality who would be leaders in developing the community. However, after *kyai* were involved in practical politics, He said that *kyai* had lost their role as a figure of morality and leaders of the community. *Kyai*'s political practices sometimes contradicted with what *kyai* said in the *pesantren* and

with Islamic thought, which was taught to *santri* in *pesantren*, especially the practice of “money politics”. (Misbah: Interview, 25/07/2007)

The evidence of the “money politics” practices conducted by *kyai* emerged in a 2007 court case, when the former *Bupati* of Jember and also *PILKADA* candidate in 2005, Syamsul Hadi Siswoyo was sentenced to 7 years for corruption. In the court, it was proven that Syamsul received 5,1 billion rupiahs from the local government’s budget and used it for his political campaign. Some of the money was given to the *kyai*, *pesantren* and other Islamic organizations in order to secure their support in the election. (Prosantina Radio: 7 February 2007, Radar Jember 10 February 2007)

Conflict and Political Rivalry among *Kyai* and *Pesantren*

In Jember District, after political reformation was commenced in 1999, conflict among *kyai* developed. There were two factors causing the conflict and rivalry among *kyai*. First were the differences among the political parties that caused the struggle for influence and mobilizing support from the people for the election. Another factor is the use of social organization such as NU and Muhammadiyah and its affiliation to gain political support in the election.

During the reformation era, *kyai* have responded to the political freedom by becoming involved in political parties. As a result, the *kyai* have become involved with more than 30 political parties and political groups. United Development Party (PPP), where most Islamic organizations affiliated in the New Order era was no longer the preferred political party of the *kyai*.¹ They have chosen to create new political parties as well as join other political parties.

In Jember District, where *kyai* had a significant influence in the community during the Soekarno and Soeharto eras, since the fall of Suharto, *kyai* have been found in every political party, even in Christian parties such as PDS². The data from KPUD Jember shows that most political party in Jem-

¹ The member of the local council from the PPP decreased from 9 seats in the 1997 election (before political reformation) to 4 seats in the 1999 election. Some *kyai* also joined GOLKAR but not many compared with *kyai* who joined PPP.

² The PDS, Partai Damai Sejahtera or Prosperous Peace Party, is a Christian (Pro-

ber placed *kyai* as a member of the party's board or as a political campaigner, especially during the 2004 and 2005 elections. 5 out of 7 political parties which have representatives in the local council also placed *kyai* as members of local councils. These political parties are not only Islamic parties, but also non-Islamic parties such as the GOLKAR Party and PDI-P. (KPUD Jember: 2005)

Nahdlatul Ulama or NU, the biggest Islamic organization which most of *kyai* and *pesantren* affiliate to, has used by *kyai* gaining political support during the election. In the *Khittah 1926*, the NU declared in 1984 it would not be involved in political parties. However, this NU's decision was ambivalent, given that it established the PKB in 1998. The NU argued that the establishment of political parties would keep the NU as "neutral" but still focus on its important goal, developing the community.

It is not surprising that the NU and the PKB are supported by the same group of people and share similar religious and ideological beliefs - *Ablussunah Waljamaah* - that can be classified as a moderate Islamic group in the Indonesian context. Consequently, these organizations were led by the same leader, which caused confusion among the followers, as both of them had different political choices during the election.

The ambiguity in the NU's political position has confused some of its supporters. Should they support the PKB or should they abide by the apolitical stance of Mukhtar NU 1984. The confusion when Abdurrahman Wahid, (Gus Dur) Syura Chairman of PKB and former chairman of NU, and Hasyim Muzadi (chairman of NU) have supported different candidates during 2004 presidential election. Gus Dur supported the GOLKAR- PKB ticket of former General Wiranto and his younger brother, Sholahudin Wahid; while Hasyim Muzadi himself was the vice-presidential candidate with President Megawati who was nominated by PDI-P. As a result, the good relationship between those two organizations was broken and conflict created between their supporters.

Conflict between two organizations, the NU and the PKB worsened during the *bupati* election (*PILKADA*) that was conducted one year after the

testant) party with 13 seats in the national parliament.

presidential election. In Jember District, the PKB, in coalition with the PDI-P, nominated MZA Jalal and Kusen Andalas as the candidates for *bupati* and deputy *bupati*. These candidates did not received support from the majority of the *kyai* and *pesantren*, especially *kyai* who were affiliated with the NU. Most *kyai* gave their support to *Haji* Baharuddin who was a member of the NU and would become a vice-*bupati* candidate on a ticket with Syamsul Hadi, the former *Bupati* of Jember. These candidates were supported by the PPP and small political parties that did not have representatives in the local council.

Because of the differences among the *kyais'* political preferences, conflicts occurred among the *santri* and *pesantrens'* communities. This condition was worsened from the *santris'* perspective, which was not used to the political differences or competition among Islamic leaders, and possibly after 32 years of the New Order regime they were used to the same political choice during elections between PPP and Golkar. The *Kyai* and Islamic organizations had accommodated the PPP and the involvement of *kyai* in the GOLKAR Party had been understood as a consequence of pressure from the government and military.

The *santris'* understanding of Islam also prohibited political competition among the *kyai*. One of the book or *Kitab* that *santri* are obliged to study in the *pesantren* is *ta'lim al muta'allim*. This *Kitab* obligates all *santri* to respect their teacher/*kyai* under any circumstance. This respect must also be given by the *santri* to *kyai's* family members. The *santri* have to follow whatever their *kyai* instructed as part of their belief to receive *barokah*.³ They also accorded the *kyai* a very high status, as leaders of morality (Molasy: 1999). These attitudes and beliefs were worsened by the limitation of democratic education for the *santri*. Abdul Qadim, Vice Chairman of PANWASLU Jember said politics and democracy was understood in different ways by *santri* and *pesantren's* communities.

“They believed that politics is part of religion, where political outcomes must be black or white and right or wrong. If someone has voted for a political party different from their own choice, this must be wrong and they will go to

³ Barakah or Barokah means “blessing” or “reward” from Allah. In Java, however, the term is conceived of by the *santri* as God’s reward given to him through his *Kyai*.

hell. This problem was worsened by the political campaigns conducted by some *kyai* who used Islamic justifications to support particular political parties or candidates” (Abdul Qadim Manembodjo: Interview, 17/07/2007)

The data collected from PANWASLU Jember shows that some conflicts during the elections campaigns between groups of people were classified as criminal, such as physical assault. For example, conflict occurred in Wuluhun Sub-District when hundreds of PDI-P supporters attacked GOLKAR Party supporters after one of *kyai* in Wuluhun claimed that a GOLKAR Party supporter had installed Golkar flags and attributes in government’s offices. Conflict also occurred in Kencong Sub-District between *pesantren* who supported the PAN and the PPP. As a result, more than 20 people were injured and some of them were hospitalized. This conflict was caused by one *kyai*’s statement during the political campaign that the PPP was the only political party struggling for Islam and the only political party that was supported by God. (PANWASLU Jember: 2005)

The data above indicate that conflict that occurred during the election was not only among the Islamic political parties but also occurred among the non-Islamic Political Parties (Secular Nationalist), as some *kyai* also supported the secular nationalist parties such as the GOLKAR Party and the PDI-P. Conflict occurred as consequence of the *santris*’ mistaken understanding that the party supported by the *kyai* was the only political party that the *santri* could vote for. These circumstances were made more difficult by the statement from a number of *kyai* during their political campaign who said people who do not support the Islamic Political Party are *munafik* or cheats (PANWASLU Jember: 2005) The Islamic Political Party who states by the *kyai* refer to PPP and PKS, as some *kyai* supported these parties,

Some *santri* interviewed in this research said that during the election, some *kyai* in the political campaign ridiculed other *kyai* and candidates. They also asked their followers to hate rival candidates. It created tension among *kyai* and their followers, some causing conflict. The *santri* said that during the election they did not feel secure because the good relationship among *santri*, their relatives and neighbors had been destroyed by some *kyais*’ political campaigns. They judged other *kyai* and *santri* as *murtad* (people who were

apostate from Islam) because they did not want to support certain political parties (Saiful Bahri: interview, 09/07/2007)

Syaiful who studied in his *pesantren* for more than 5 years says during the political campaign, a *kyai* asked him to join his preferred political party, but he declined. As a result, another *pesantren*'s alumnus who was also his friend began to hate him and labeled him as a *murtad*. It produced disharmony among people who lived in the community. Syaiful argues that some *kyai* did not do the right thing during the election. (Saiful Bahri: interview, 09/07/2007)

Another *pesantren* alumnus, Anwari, also agree with Syaiful. According to Anwari, in some cases *kyai* also pressed their followers to become involved in the conflict. He gave an example of when one *kyai* had been interviewed by police regarding a "money politics" case, the *kyai* asked the followers to lead a demonstration in order to pressure the police.

"This *kyai* asked his *santri* and alumni to join a demonstration. You know that demonstrations often end with fighting the police, (laughter). This means that *kyai* asked us to fight with the police?" (Anwari: Interview, 25/07/2007)

Anwari stated that this situation has caused the *santri* and *kyai*'s followers to lose their respect for the *kyai*. In political processes, after *kyai* were involved in political parties, *kyai* no longer educated people with the right interpretation of democracy. Anwari said *kyai* only used democracy to justify their political opinions (Anwari: Interview, 25/07/2007)

Kyai as the Centre of Community Development

The *kyai*'s involvement in political parties has caused a decrease of their *pesantren*'s contribution to developing the community. As a result of *kyai*'s involvement in political parties, a lot of *kyai* spend most of their time in political activities, as they are members of Parliament, the local council, and official members of political parties. They are no longer concerned with *pesantren*, especially in developing the community and educating *santri*.

Some *pesantren* have lost their leaders and teachers and in turn, the quality of *pesantren*'s education has been decreasing. Amal (2003) used two indicators to measure the quality of the *pesantren*, the quality of teachers (*kyai* and

ustadz) and the quality of the product of *pesantren* (*santri*). Amal found that *kyai* who are involved in political parties and who are central figures in the *pesantren* are no longer involved as teachers in the *pesantren*. Some senior *kyai* in *pesantren* have been replaced by *ustadz* and junior *kyai*, some of them do not have the capability as a teacher. In terms of quality of *santri*, he argues that there is a trend where *santri* seem to study in *salaf pesantren* where *kyai* are not involved in politics rather than *pesantren* where the *kyai* has involved with politics. The *kyais'* involvement in politics has hindered *pesantren's* function as the centre of community development. *Kyai* rarely conduct or attend the weekly *Pengajian* and *Selamatan* with the people around *pesantren*. *Kyai* usually ask their assistants /senior *santri* to attend and lead the *Pengajian*.

These circumstances have been worsened by the *pesantren's* management system, because it does not have a good teacher recruitment system. The *Kyai* prefer to choose their son or other family members to replace their position as leaders and teachers in *pesantren* rather than choosing a qualified person. Some *kyai's* sons were also more interested in studying in public universities rather than studying in *pesantren* or an Islamic university. Another problem was that *kyai's* sons were also interested in politics rather than being a teacher in *pesantren*. As a result, nowadays some *pesantren* are led by a person who has no ability in Islamic teaching or teaching management.

Some *pesantren* are also lost its function as an organization responsible for community development. This function is replaced by NGOs and other community organizations that developed very quickly after political reformation. (Amal: 2003) As a result, the people's respect for the *pesantren* has decreased, especially the community around *pesantren*, which previously had a strong relationship with the *kyai*, and *pesantren*.

Data collected from *Rabithah Ma'abid Islamiyah* (RMI), an organization which is concerned with *pesantren* and Islamic education, show the number of *pesantren* in Jember District has increased since 2000, but during the same period the number of *santri* has decreased, especially in traditional (*salaf*) and modern *pesantren* where *kyai* were involved in political parties⁴. There are

⁴ *Nabdlatul Ulama* has categorized *pesantren* into two types, first is the traditional *pesantren* (also known as *salaf pesantren*) which does not provide formal education recognized by the government. This type of *pesantren* teaches its *santri* Islamic religion using traditional

two reasons that triggered the increasing number of *pesantren*. First is the political condition after New Order which gave the opportunity for family members of the *kyai* to create new *pesantren*, and there was no longer government political pressure on the *kyai* or *pesantren* as was the case during the New Order.

Another reason is the local government's support for the *pesantren*. After the implementation of local autonomy, the Jember local government created some programs to support *pesantren*. One of them was financial support to *pesantren* based on the institution and the number of *santri*. Every *pesantren* would receive Rp 500.000, - to Rp. 50.000.000, - depending on the number of *santri* and the seniority of the *kyai*. The government's financial support in turn motivated *ustadz* who teach Qur'an in *langgar* (small mosque) in order to establish new *pesantren*. When they establish new *pesantren*, they will receive a certain sum of money from the government plus a financial subsidy for *guru ngaji* (the teacher of *pesantren*)

Table 1. The Number of *Pesantren* and *Santri* in Jember District

	1980-1984	2001	2005	% 2001 to 2005
<i>Pesantren</i>	400 - 450 ⁵	673	814	20.95
<i>Santri</i>	-	17.712	18.763	5.93

Sources: RMI Jember, Office White Board, June 2007 ⁶

Table 1 shows the number of *pesantren* in Jember increased dramatically during 2001 to 2005. In 2005 the number of *pesantren* in Jember was 814; this means that there was an increase of 20.95 % in 4 years or an increase of 5.24 % each year. This number is 2,5 times larger compared to the number of villages in Jember which was only 316. (BPS Jember: 2005) There is no specific data related to the number of *santri* during the New Order regime,

methods called *sorogan*. Another type of *pesantren* is the modern *pesantren* that uses modern methods to teach its *santri*. This type of *pesantren* also has formal schools and provides certificates for its *santri* that are recognized by the government.

⁵ The data was collected by interviewing some *kyai*. The data provides an approximation as there is no reliable data about the number of *pesantren* in Jember during the New Order regime. The first research about *pesantren* in Jember was conducted by RMI in 2001.

⁶ The researcher could not find the hard copy version of the data, the only data which was written on the white board in the RMI's office.

the only data collected were by RMI in 2005 which show that the number of *santri* in Jember was 18.763, increase just 5.93 % from 2001 which was 17.712 *santri*.

Pondok Pesantren Riyadbussholihin led by Madini Farouq, the Chairman of Jember Local Council only had around 150 *santries*⁷. In the 1990s, according to Abdul Muis, Vice Chairman of RMI, this *pesantren* had more than 1500 *santries*⁸. A similar phenomenon occurred in *Al-Fattah Pesantren* led by Afton Ilman Huda which had only 200 *santri*⁹. During the Soeharto regime, where *kyai* were not involved in political parties, this *pesantren* had around 2000 *santries* and was led by senior *kyai*, *Kyai Haji Achmad Dhofier*. (Afton: Interview, 15/07/2007)

Being active in political activities, Afton had no time to teach his *santri* in the *pesantren*. As a result, the quality of *pesantren* decreased as his brothers who replaced him teaching in *pesantren* did not have the same quality or capability as Afton. This condition, in turn decreased the interest of parents and *santri* to study in his *pesantren*. Another factor was that the parents and *santri* who supported other political parties were unwilling to study in *Pesantren Al-Fattah* as this *pesantren* strongly supported PKB during the election. Afton argued that this problem was a common risk as he was a politician. He said that some *kyai* could eliminate this problem by introducing a comprehensive understanding of politics. (Afton: Interview, 15/07/2007)

Some *kyai* also moved to other cities, as they were Members of Parliament and provincial councils. These *kyai* were no longer teaching their *santri* in *pesantren* and asked their senior *santri* or other family members to replace their positions as teachers and community leaders. *Pesantren Darussolab – Tegalbesar* is a good example to describe how education in *pesantren* has been facing problems after *kyai* left *pesantren*. *Kyai Haji Yusuf Muhammad* who is a senior *kyai* in Jember led *Pesantren Darussolab* for more than 30 years. In 1999 he was elected as a Member of the Indonesian Parliament

⁷ This *pondok pesantren* does not have data about the number of *santri*. Data used in this research was based on observations conducted by researchers in June 2007.

⁸ Abdul Muis is a *kyai* in Jember, and also the son of a senior *kyai* in Jember who is respected by most *kyai* and *santri*. Abdul Muis also led RMI for more than 10 years and has close relationships with *Riyadhussholihin* and *Al-Fattah Pesantren*.

⁹ Based on researcher observations in June 2007

(DPR) and moved to Jakarta. After he left Jember, his *pesantren* was led by 5 senior *santrius*. According to Afton Ilman Huda, who had a close relationship with Yusuf Muhammad as an uncle, for the first and second year Yusuf Muhammad still controlled the *pesantren*, and for at least one week in every month he stayed with his *santrius* in *pesantren*. However, after that he was replaced by his younger brother as the leader in *pesantren* who did not have the ability in Islamic teaching management. As a result the education quality in this *pesantren* has declined and more *santri* have left this *pesantren*. (Afton: Interview, 15/07/2007)

Conclusion

The research has found three factors involved in the changing relations between *Kyai* and *santri* (and also *kyai's* followers) in politics. It causes the decreasing political support to *kyai's* preferred political party and candidate. The main problem is the *kyai* who have involved in politics mostly have become involved in “money politics” that have not been accepted by their *santri*. As a result, *santri* no longer regard their *kyai* as the symbol of morality, and because the *kyai* have breached the religions and social norms. Another problem is the involvement of *kyai* in politics has brought *kyai* and *pesantren* to political conflict and rivalry. It makes confusion among *santri* and *pesantren* community, as they are not used to make political choices and deal with the conflicts that might occur in the political processes. Finally, the *pesantren* in which the *kyai* was involved in politics have lost their function as the centre of community development as they do not have time to maintain their role in community education and spend most of their time in political activities.

The research was conducted in the District of Jember, East Java, where the political atmosphere has been dominated by *kyai* and *pesantren*. The pattern of politics and the role of *kyai* analyzed might not be reflected elsewhere in Indonesia, because of differences in culture, political context and social tradition. However, I do believe this research has contributed, especially in examining the role of community leaders in the political arena.

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